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Property Rights Legislation in Agricultural
Biotechnology: United States and Argentina
Andres A. Gallo* & Jay P. Kesan**
INTRODUCTION
The market for biotechnology products has expanded
rapidly in the 1990s and is expected to result in radical changes
in agriculture around the world.1 Investment in research and
development of new seed varieties has become a key factor for
agricultural development.2 In the past few decades, the
investment in research and development has largely shifted
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1. The market for transgenic crops will continue to grow:
The [International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications] ISAAA projects that the global market value of
transgenic crops will increase from between $4.5 billion and $4.7
billion in 2003, to $5 billion or more in 2005. In 2002, the global
market was estimated at $4 billion, representing 15 percent of the
$31 billion global crop protection market and 13 percent of the $30
billion global commercial seed market. The ISAAA says the estimated
market value is based on the sale price of transgenic seed plus any
technology fees that apply.
Doris de Guzman, Surge in US Biotech Crops Continues, CHEM. MARKET REP.,
Apr. 12, 2004, at 13.
2. The high cost of research and development is a limiting factor in
emergence of biotechnology products:
Biotechnology is an expensive market to break into. Sources
estimate that biotechnology research and development (R&D) costs
more than $200 million for just one product. . . . [G]etting a biotech
drug to market is a difficult and expensive process. After years of
laboratory research, hurdles consisting of clinical trials and
governmental approval must be crossed before a drug can even make
it to market.
Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection and Agricultural
Biotechnology: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
464, 465-66 (2000) (citation omitted).
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from state-sponsored research to private funding.3 At the same
time, the market became dominated by a few multinational
firms that now control most biotechnological research and
development around the world.4 In this new environment of
largely private control of an international market, the
protection of intellectual property rights and its role in shaping
the biotech market have drawn academic attention and been

3. See Philip G. Pardey, Bonwoo Koo & Carol Nottenburg, Creating,
Protecting, and Using Crop Biotechnologies Worldwide in an Era of
Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 213, 217 (2004). This shift
seems to be the result of robust growth of private research and development
(R&D) funding while public funding has remained relatively constant:
The dramatic increase in private sector plant breeding R&D
expenditures came while public expenditure in that area changed
very little in real terms. On the whole, private spending on plant
breeding has steadily increased since 1960 as the seed industry
increased in size and extent of commercialization. Private sector R&D
expenditure has shifted over this period, in percentage terms, from
farm machinery and food and kindred products to agricultural
chemicals and plant breeding research.
JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE SEED INDUSTRY IN
U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF DATA AND INFORMATION ON CROP
SEED MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT 42 (2004) (citation omitted).
Private agricultural research is displacing public research
generally and specifically regarding the development of new varieties
of crops that have high commercial value. This tendency is especially
pronounced in countries like the United States where private
agricultural research and development was ninety percent of public
spending in 1960, growing to 133 percent by 1996, the latest year for
which comparable public-private data are available. Private
investments, fueled by agricultural biotechnology research, gravitate
to techniques which promise large markets, are protected by
intellectual property rights, and are easily transferable across
agroecologies.
Pardey, Koo & Nottenburg, supra, at 217-18 (footnotes omitted).
4. “The 1990s have witnessed considerable acceleration in the process of
consolidation of the seed industry with the emergence of giant life-science
companies. Companies such as Novartis, Monsanto, Du Pont, Astra-Zeneca,
Dow Agrosciences, and Aventis are major players not only in seeds, but also in
agro-chemicals, pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and vaccines.” C.S. Srinivasan,
Concentration in Ownership of Plant Variety Rights: Some Implications for
Developing Countries, 28 FOOD POL’Y 519, 522 (2003). “According to RAFI, the
top five Gene Giants (AstaZeneca [sic], DuPont, Monsanto, Novartis and
Aventis) account for nearly two-thirds of the global pesticide market (60%),
almost one-quarter (23%) of the commercial seed market, and virtually 100%
of the transgenic (genetically modified) seed market.” Press Release, Rural
Advancement Found. Int’l, World Seed Conference: Shrinking Club of
Industry Giants Gather for Wake or Pep Rally? (Sept. 3, 1999),
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/news_worldseed.pdf.
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the focus of many articles and studies.5
Governments,
international organizations, the private sector (firms and
farmers), scholars, and scientists are discussing the
implications of these changes in the market for seeds and how
property rights should be defined and enforced to promote
social welfare.6 Private companies have tried to enforce
intellectual property rights over new varieties of seeds in
international markets to protect their investments. However,
different countries offer different legal protection, and in many
cases developing countries have insisted on minimal property
rights to favor their farmers and obtain new technologies at the
lowest possible cost.7
5. See, e.g., Julian M. Alston & Raymond J. Venner, The Effects of the US
Plant Variety Protection Act on Wheat Genetic Improvement, 31 RES. POL’Y 527
(2002); M.C.F. Diez, The Impact of Plant Varieties Rights on Research: The
Case of Spain, 27 FOOD POL’Y 171 (2002); George B. Frisvold, John Sullivan &
Anton Raneses, Genetic Improvements in Major US Crops: The Size and
Distribution of Benefits, 28 AGRIC. ECON.: J. INT’L ASS’N AGRIC. ECONOMISTS
109 (2003); Peter D. Goldsmith, Innovation, Supply Chain Control, and the
Welfare of Farmers, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1302 (2001); Gregory D. Graff,
Gordon C. Rausser & Arthur A. Small, Agricultural Biotechnology’s
Complementary Intellectual Assets, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 349 (2003); Mark
D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . .?,
39 HOUS. L. REV. 727 (2002) [hereinafter Janis & Kesan, Sound and Fury];
Kesan, supra note 2; William Lesser, Intellectual Property Rights and
Concentration in Agricultural Biotechnology, 1 AGBIOFORUM 56 (1998);
GianCarlo Moschini & Harvey Lapan, Intellectual Property Rights and the
Welfare Effects of Agricultural R&D, 79 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1229 (1997); D.D.
Rohrbach, I.J. Minde & J. Howard, Looking Beyond National Boundaries:
Regional Harmonization of Seed Policies, Laws and Regulations, 28 FOOD
POL’Y 317 (2003); Timothy Swanson & Timo Göschl, Property Rights Issues
Involving Plant Genetic Resources: Implications of Ownership for Economic
Efficiency, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 75 (2000); GianCarlo Moschini, Economic
Benefits and Costs of Biotechnology Innovations in Agriculture (Ctr. for Agric.
and Rural Dev., Iowa State Univ., Working Paper No. 01-WP 264, 2001),
available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_1924.pdf;
Peter Goldsmith, Gabriel Ramos & Carlos Steiger, Intellectual Property
Protection and the International Marketing of Agricultural Biotechnology:
(2002),
Firm
and
Host
Country
Impacts
http://www.farmfoundation.org/projects/documents/case2_ipr22.pdf; Mark D.
Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Weed-Free I.P.: The Supreme Court, Intellectual
Property Interfaces, and the Problem of Plants (Nov. 2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=290634 [hereinafter Janis & Kesan, WeedFree I.P.].
6. See, e.g., FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3; see also Pardey, Koo &
Nottenburg, supra note 3 (describing the role of intellectual property rights in
the international context).
7. This seems to reflect a dichotomy between the Northern and Southern
Hemispheres:
The argument made by Northern countries is that while prices may
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One of the most important issues regarding biotechnology
is the legal environment in which seeds are to be produced and
traded.
A homogeneous legal framework characterizes
domestic markets, while different legal regimes can distort or
change marketing and production incentives in international
markets. This Article analyzes the legal differences between
the United States and Argentina, two of the most important
exporters of grains in the world. As we show, the evolution of
laws and regulations in both countries helps us understand the
challenges of generating uniform protection in international
markets as well as the incentives for private sector companies
under different legal systems. We will highlight the differences
in property rights protection as well as the incentives for
producers and traders.
ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD
MARKETS
Argentina and the United States are important actors in
international agricultural markets. In Argentina, the market
liberalization during the 1990s gave new impetus to
agricultural production, and soybean was one of the crops that
benefited the most.8 An intensified interest in new seed
varieties and the introduction of genetically modified seeds in
1996 accompanied the impressive growth in grain exports.9

rise in the short run, new technologies will be available over the long
term and will, in turn, raise economic productivity. As the result of
protected property rights, the South will gain from new investment. . .
. For the net technology using countries (South) the significant short
term costs may arise directly from an increase in the cost of the input
due to the lack of complete substitutes and indirectly from the
administrative and enforcement costs of a Northern style [intellectual
property rights] IPR protection system. Adding to the complexity is
the fact that welfare impacts are best understood in a dynamic
context, as the short-term losses of strengthening the South’s IPR
regime are believed to be trumped by the long-term gain from
economic growth.
Goldsmith, Ramos & Steiger, supra note 5, at 4 (citations omitted).
8. See RANDALL D. SCHNEPF, ERIK N. DOHLMAN & CHRISTINE BOLLING,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE IN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA:
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR MAJOR FIELD CROPS 22 (2001).
9. See id. at 23.
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GRAPH 1. CORN AND SOYBEAN PLANTED IN ARGENTINA10
Graph 1: Hectares Planted with Corn and Soybean
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Since the 1978-79 season, the area planted with soybean in
Argentina has steadily grown (Graph 1).11 The total growth
from 1978 to 2003 reached 669%, while total production went
from 2.5 million metric tons to 35 million in 2003. During the
same period the area planted with corn declined 6.5%, but
production increased 72.9% due to improvements in yield. The
boom in soybean production has propelled Argentina into the
spotlight in international markets. Total production of corn
represented just 2.6% of total world production for the period
1999-2000 to 2001-02. Nonetheless, total exports of coarse
grains were 11.6% of total world exports (Table 2).
Argentina and the United States are among the largest
exporters of grain and oilseeds (Tables 1 and 2). In the case of
soybeans, the United States and Argentina represent 58.2% of
total world exports, while Argentina is the main exporter of
soybean oil and meal. The United States and Argentina are
the leading exporters of coarse grains (Table 2). The United
States also leads the world in wheat exports, and Argentina
ranks fifth (Table 2). As a result, both countries play an
important role in international agriculture markets. The
strength of both countries in international markets is also

10. For graph data, see Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia Pesca y
Alimentos
(SAGPyA),
Estimaciones
Agricolas,
http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/00/agricultura/otros/estimaciones/basestima.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
11. See id.
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reflected in the market for new seeds (Table 3). In this case,
the United States is first in the consumption of new varieties
while Argentina is eighth. Finally, Argentina, following the
United States, was one of the earliest adopters of genetically
modified crops, especially soybean and corn.12 Since 1996, the
Argentine government has approved the use of genetically
modified seeds, and farmers have been adopting Roundup
Ready soybean and Bt corn intensively.13 In the case of
soybean, the area sown with genetically modified seeds rose
from 6% in 1996 to 99.5% in 2002-03, while genetically
modified corn increased from 0.25% to 40% during the same
period; cotton went from 2.7% to 20%.14 Despite the impressive
increase in new technological advances, there are important
gaps in the amount of investment in research and development
of new varieties, which are, in part, due to the investment gap
between developed and developing countries.15 Part of this gap
also corresponds to the incentives offered by different
regulatory regimes in each country.16
12. “In 2002 four countries accounted for 99% of total area sown with
genetically modified crops: United States with 39.0 million hectares (66% of
total), Argentina with 13.5 million hectares (23%), Canada with 3.5 million
hectares (6% of total) and China with 2.1 million hectares (4% of total).”
CARMEN VICIEN, TENEDENCIAS EN EL DESARROLLO E INTRODUCCION DE
MATERIALES GENETICAMENTE MODIFICADOS EN EL SECTOR AGRICOLA
ARGENTINO. ESTUDIO SOBRE EL SECTOR AGROALIMENTARIO. COMPONENTE B:
REDES AGROALIMENTARIAS.
TRAMAS.
OFICINA DE LA CEPAL-ONU –
MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA DE LA NACION 5 (2003) (on file with authors).
13. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION
ON PRICES OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED SEEDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ARGENTINA 7 (2000).
14. See
OSCAR AGUSTIN DOMINGO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MEDIUM-SIZED ARGENTINIAN SEED
COMPANY
8
(2003),

http://www.upov.int/en/documents/Symposium2003/wipo_upov_sym_13.pdf.
15. This gap is significant and may be growing:
In 1995 developed countries spent $5.43 on public and private
agricultural research and development for every one hundred dollars
of agricultural output, compared with just sixty-six cents per one
hundred dollars of output for developing countries. The eightfold
difference in total research intensities illustrates the size of the
technological gap in agriculture between rich and poor countries.
Moreover, the situation is growing worse. The difference in public
research intensity ratios was 3.5-fold in the 1970s, compared with 4.3fold now. An even wider gap would have opened up if private
spending was also factored in.
Pardey, Koo & Nottenburg, supra note 3, at 218 (footnotes omitted).
16. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Insecure Property Rights and
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Given the important role the United States and Argentina
play in international grain markets, an analysis of the
differences in property rights legislation is meaningful to
understand market behavior and the incentives producers face
in each country.
TABLE 1. INTERNATIONAL EXPORTS IN SOYBEAN17

Table 1: International Trade: Soybean Exports
Brazil
Argentina
Paraguay
Bolivia
United States
Canada
Asia
China
Rest of World

(Percentage of Total World Exports)
Soybean Soybean Meal
Soybean Oil
33.4
32.0
28.5
13.7
42.8
50.3
4.4
1.8
1.9
0.5
2.2
2.6
44.5
12.4
5.8
1.6
0.2
0.2
0.7
6.7
1.7
0.6
1.5
0.4
0.3
1.9
8.8

Plant Varieties: The Effect on the Market for Seeds in Argentina 14-20 (July
25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgibin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=16347&ftype=.pdf (showing how differences in
property rights protection between Argentina and the United States has
produced a lower amount of investment in Argentina’s seed market).
17. For table data, see U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Market and Trade Data,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/archive/asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
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TABLE 2. INTERNATIONAL EXPORTS IN COARSE GRAINS AND
WHEAT18

Table 2: International Trade: Coarse Grains
and Wheat
(Percentage of Total World Exports)
Coarse Grains
Wheat
Argentina

11.6

Argentina

8.9

Australia

4.8

Australia

13.4

Canada

2.6

Canada

13.0

China

9.4

India

3.5

Brazil

3.6

Kazakhstan

3.9

Russia

2.2

Russia

6.4

South Africa

1.2

Syria

0.7

Turkey

1.0

Ukraine

4.3

Ukraine

3.8

EU-25

5.9

EU-25

13.4

Others

4.5

United States

49.8

Other Europe

1.1

Others

5.7

United States

25.1

Note: Coarse Grains include Corn, Barley, Sorghum, Rye and
Oats

18. For table data, see U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FASonline,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/oilseeds/circular/2006/06-02/toc.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2006).
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TABLE 3. INTERNATIONAL SEED MARKETS19

Table 3: Estimated Values of Commercial
Markets for Seed
Country
United States
China
Japan
Commonwealth of
Independent States
France
Brazil
Germany
Argentina
India
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Poland
Mexico
Spain
Netherlands
Australia
Hungary
Denmark
Sweden
Other
Total

Internal Commercial Market
(Million of Dollars)
5700
23.2%
3000
12.2%
2500
10.2%
2000
8.1%
1370
1200
1000
930
900
650
570
550
400
350
300
300
280
200
200
200
1967
24567

5.6%
4.9%
4.1%
3.8%
3.7%
2.6%
2.3%
2.2%
1.6%
1.4%
1.2%
1.2%
1.1%
0.8%
0.8%
0.8%
8.0%

PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AROUND THE WORLD
Property rights protection for seeds in international
markets is far from uniform.20 Each country has devised its
own rules and regulations, and producers have to deal with
these differences when trading or doing business with other

19. See FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 8.
20. See W. Lesser, An Economic Approach to Identifying an “Effective Sui
Generis System” for Plant Variety Protection Under TRIPs, 16 AGRIBUSINESS
96, 109-10 (2000) (explaining some different types of property rights protection
in the international arena).
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countries. One of the most important initiatives for the
homogenization of intellectual property rights is the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)21
established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for all
member countries.22
Another important organization seeking uniformity for
plant variety protection is the International Union for the
This
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).23
international organization is comprised of a group of countries
that designs rules for the protection of property rights.24 Even
though UPOV is representative of the international
community, it lacks any enforcement power, and the guidelines
and rules approved must be implemented by member
governments.25 In this regard, UPOV resolutions have to be
broad enough to be accepted in each member country. If UPOV
recommendations are too specific or strict, many countries,
especially developing countries that are consumers of the new
technologies, might not comply. On the other hand, if the rules
are too broad, there is no meaningful protection of property
rights for seed producers. For this reason, United States
companies have been very uneasy about UPOV, since UPOV
rules provide less stringent property rights protection than the
domestic regulatory system. On the other hand, countries like

21. The aim of TRIPS was to establish a uniform standard for intellectual
property protection:
In 1994 the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Before TRIPS, the only international
framework for intellectual property was the Paris Convention of 1883,
but unlike TRIPS, the Paris Convention did not impose any uniform
standard of intellectual property protection and countries were free to
establish their own intellectual property laws.
Amy Nelson, Note, Is There an International Solution to Intellectual Property
Protection for Plants?, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 997, 1008 (2005) (footnotes
omitted).
22. “TRIPS thus requires WTO Member States to provide some form of
intellectual property protection for plant varieties.” Id.
23. See International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
http://www.upov.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
24. See Members of the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.org/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (listing the member nations and the date at which
they became members).
25. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 1004.
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Argentina find UPOV rules to be too strict for local farmers
and, as a result, have failed to pass some of these rules into
law.26
The first general UPOV proposal was agreed upon in 1978
(UPOV 78),27 and it recommended that the participant
countries establish a system of property rights protection for
seeds based on the granting of commercialization rights,28 a
legal instrument similar to the Plan Variety Protection Act
(PVPA) certificates in the United States.29 This system was
considered a novelty in many developing countries, and the
European Union supported it, yet it was considered insufficient
for the United States government and most of the private
sector engaged in the production of seeds.30 Because of
pressure from the private sector and the Unites States
government, UPOV approved a new set of recommendations in
26. Concerns about local agriculture and farmers have affected
implementation of plant variety protection rights in many developing
countries:
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs), which followed from the international trade
negotiations of the Uruguay Round, requires all member-countries of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide for an “effective”
system of plant variety protection within a specified time frame. This
has significantly accelerated the spread of PVP systems across
countries. Many developing countries are currently in the process of
enacting PVP legislation, even as they face an intense debate about
the potential economic impacts of PVP on their agriculture and
farmers.
C.S. Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 520 (footnote and citation omitted).
27. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703 (as revised at Geneva on Oct. 23, 1978)
available
at
http://www.upov.org/en/publications/conventions/1978/pdf/act1978.pdf .
28. See id. at art. 5.
29. See 7 U.S.C. § 2351(a) (2000).
30. Plant variety protection rights may be inherently less valuable than
other forms of intellectual property:
Under plant variety protection schemes, farmers may legally save,
reuse, and sometimes sell seeds in following seasons so that seed
firms are faced with only the residual demand for their seeds in
subsequent seasons. This problem, together with the difficulty of
monitoring and enforcing property rights to seed, makes its legal
protection less valuable than other forms of protection on other
products. Private seed markets have responded to the appropriability
problem by developing hybrid varieties or pursuing genetic use
restriction technologies (GURTs). These methods prevent seeds from
effectively reproducing and serve as a form of “biological” rather than
legal property protection.
Pardey, Koo & Nottenburg, supra note 3, at 225 (footnote omitted).
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1991 (UPOV 91).31 The recommendations included more robust
protection, limiting farmers’ rights of use32 and allowing the
coexistence of diverse regulatory regimes for seed production.33
The last issue was particularly important for the United States,
where seed producers have a vast array of legal instruments to
protect their varieties, such as a PVPA certificate, a plant
patent, or even a utility patent. Despite this effort to bring the
United States closer to the international regulatory regime,
UPOV 91 has faced opposition in several countries. For
example, despite some attempts, Congress in Argentina has not
approved UPOV 91,34 and, as a consequence, foreign seed
producers cannot resort to the patent system for their varieties.
Thus, a uniform international regulatory regime for seed
producers remains an unrealized goal. Seed producers will face
different regulatory frameworks in different countries, and the
adaptation to those regimes is important for their economic
success.
Furthermore, incentives for production and
commercialization of new varieties in international markets
will be affected by differences in property rights protection.
Business strategies will differ from country to country, and

31. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703 (as revised at Geneva on Mar. 19, 1991)
[hereinafter
UPOV91],
available
at
http://www.upov.org/en/publications/conventions/1991/pdf/act1991.pdf.
32. See id. at art. 14. Under the 1991 Act countries have implemented
farmers’ rights differently:
The 1978 UPOV Act allows a universal farmers’ privilege – indirectly
by not classifying such use as an infringement. The 1991 Act (Article
15.2), however, makes the farmers’ exemption optional at the national
level. The US has decided to allow a full Farmers’ Exemption, while
the EU requires that large farms pay a royalty.
Lesser, supra note 20, at 111 (citation omitted).
33. See UPOV91, supra note 31, at art. 4. The 1991 Act obviated the need
for member nations to make an either/or choice of intellectual property forms
for plant varieties:
Whereas the 1961 UPOV Convention stipulated that each member
state could recognize the right of the breeder by granting either a
special title of protection or a patent, the 1991 UPOV Convention
stipulates only that each contracting party shall grant and protect
breeders’ rights, thereby allowing EPC member states to eliminate
the exclusionary provisions for plant varieties from their patent acts.
Nelson, supra note 21, at 1005-06 (footnote omitted).
34. See Members of the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.org/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
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technology transfers to less developed countries could suffer
from this heterogeneity.
SEED PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Intellectual property protection for seeds in the United
States is very well enforced. Seed producers can resort to
various legal instruments to protect their inventions and
enforce their property rights in the marketplace.35 As a result,
the intellectual property regime in the United States is one of
the friendliest in the world for biotechnology inventors. The
regimes available for seed producers include the Plant Patent
Act of 1930 (PPA),36 PVPA certificates,37 and the Patent Act of
35. See Janis & Kesan, Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 730-45
(describing the protection and incentives provided by the various intellectual
property regimes in the United States).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000). This was the first U.S. law to specifically
address plant breeding:
The first IPR legislation enacted to specifically address issues of plant
breeding was the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA). Administered by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the PPA provides
patent protection over asexually or vegetatively reproduced plant
varieties. The PPA also includes patent protection for spores,
mutants, hybrids, newly found seedlings, or plants found in an
uncultivated state, and extends property rights for a period of 17
years.
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 19. “[I]n the Townsend-Purnell Plant
Patent Act of 1930, Congress created a plant patent regime limited to varieties
that had been asexually reproduced.” Janis & Kesan, Sound and Fury, supra
note 5, at 734-35 (footnote omitted). “Enactment of the PPA was driven
largely by an increasing concern that plant breeders should be rewarded like
other inventors for their investment in developing new plant varieties, and
that the absence of patent rights would undermine the incentive to engage in
plant breeding.” Nelson, supra note 21, at 999 (footnote omitted).
37. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2331, 2351-2357, 2371-2372, 2401-2404, 24212427, 2441-2443, 2461-2463, 2481-2486, 2501-2504, 2531-2532, 2541-2545,
2561-2570, 2581-2583 (2000). “The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA)
grants breeders a Certificate of Protection that gives them exclusive rights to
market a new plant variety for 18 years from the date of issuance. These
exclusive rights are subject to a research exemption and a farmer’s
exemption.” FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 19.
The 1994 amendment to the PVPA, which went into effect in April
1995, brought the PVPA into conformity with international standards
established by the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants and allowed the United States to ratify the 1991
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties.
Protection provided by Certificates of Protection extended from 18 to
20 years for most crops.
Id. “Plant variety protection is also now a fixture of U.S. law, the U.S. PVPA
having been enacted in 1970 after only the briefest of debate.” Janis & Kesan,
Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 742 (footnote omitted).
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1952.38 The extension of property rights protection for seed
producers reached a high point when the U.S. Supreme Court
reinforced the role of utility patents for plant varieties. By
allowing the use of utility patents for plants in the key case of
Diamond v. Chakrabarty39 and in the recent case of J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Breed Int’l, Inc.,40 the Supreme Court
gave seed producers full protection for their new varieties.41 In

[W]hen the Clinton Administration finally submitted the 1991 text of
the UPOV treaty to the Senate for ratification, the Administration
emphasized the benefits of the PVPA as a reciprocity vehicle. The
United States did eventually join the UPOV, perhaps guaranteeing
the continued existence of the U.S. PVPA in some form.
Id. at 745 (footnotes omitted).
The PVPA provides patent-like coverage for plants not covered by the
PPA (that is, sexually-reproduced plants and tuber-propagated
plants). . . . Under the PVPA, protection extends to selling, importing,
exporting, sexually reproducing, or using the variety to produce
another variety. The PVPA, however, contains a save seed exemption
and a research exemption.
Nelson, supra note 21, at 1002 (footnotes omitted).
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). This greatly expanded the subject matter
eligible for protection:
The Patent Act of 1952 (PA) extends patent rights to agricultural
innovations under a much more general category that includes “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof.” Patent
protection under the PA covers agricultural machinery, equipment,
chemicals, production processes, and similar inventions, and is
termed “utility patent protection.” More importantly, the PA’s broad
definition of what may be entitled to patent protection leaves an
important opening for covering innovations in biotechnology and
genetic engineering.
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 19.
39. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). “In Chakrabarty, decided in 1980, the Court
ushered in the age of biotechnology patenting, holding in a 5-4 split that
genetically-modified bacteria fell within the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter.” Janis & Kesan, Weed-Free I.P., supra note 5, at 7.
40. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
41. See id. at 145.
In a 6-2 decision handed down in December 2001, the US Supreme
Court has confirmed that plants are eligible subject matter for
protection under the utility patent regime, notwithstanding the
existence of limited forms of intellectual property protection for plants
under the Plant Patent Act (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection
Act (PVPA). The case, J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, endorsed
a longstanding practice of the US Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), under which the PTO has issued hundreds of utility patents on
plants since 1985.
Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection for Plant
Innovation: Unresolved Issues After J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 20 NATURE

KESAN FINAL

05/11/2006 02:16:40 PM

2006] AGRICULTURAL BIOTECH & PROPERTY RIGHTS

579

addition, the U.S. government amended the PVPA regime to
conform to the new UPOV agreement of 1991.42 That said,
producers consider the PVPA regime, proposed by UPOV to
promote regulatory uniformity, to be a weak tool for the
protection of property rights when considered alone without a
utility patent regime.
These legal developments were
accompanied by an impressive increase in private sector
participation in seed production and a rush to patent new
varieties (Tables 4 and 5). We also observed an increase in the
number of utility patents devoted to biotechnology patents for
plant varieties (Graph 2). Furthermore, these legal changes
helped to foster research and development efforts in
biotechnology and the creation and adoption of genetically
modified seeds. As a result, we have a system in which
property rights are well-defined and enforced, and researchers
can choose the level of protection they consider sufficient to
effectively protect their inventions in the market.
GRAPH 2. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES43
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BIOTECHNOLOGY 1161, 1161 (2002) (footnote omitted).
42 See FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 20.

43 For graph data, see Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Data:
Agricultural
Biotechnology
Intellectual
Property,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic1.htm (last visited
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TABLE 4. AWARDED AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES44
Table 4: U.S. agricultural biotechnology patent awards by technology
classification, 1976-2000 1/
Technology Class
1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- Total
80
85
90
95
2000
Plant Technologies
54
91 244 576 2,011 2,976
Protection, Nutrition, and
76
154 277 512
865 1,884
Biological Control of Plants
and Animals
Pharmaceuticals
72
89 150 248
718 1,277
Patented organisms, Nonplant
14
76 214 347
795 1,446
Metabolic Pathways and
39
25
79 166
454 763
Biological Processes in
Animals
Metabolic Pathways and
156
181 263 255
716 1,571
Biological Processes in Plants
0
5
79 199
961 1,244
Metabolic Pathways and
Biological Processes, DNAScale
Genetic Transformation
25
100 364 908 2,732 4,129
Genomics
0
0
10
54
265 329
U.S. agricultural biotechnology patent awards by assignee sector and
national origin, 1976-2000
1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- Total
80
85
90
95
2000
U.S. Firm
167
239 481 893 2,551 4,331
U.S. Nonprofit
49
104 231 526 1,434 2,344
U.S. Government
18
27
54 129
193 421
U.S. Independent
0
2
3
7
15
27
Non-U.S. Firm
107
162 434 660 1,688 3,051
Non-U.S. Nonprofit
5
13
31 103
291 443
Non-U.S. Government
14
24
38
79
214 369
Non-U.S. Independent
1
5
7
14
14
41
Unknown/other
21
26
49 106
233 435
1/ Table entries may not sum to totals because some patents are classified in
multiple areas, others in none.

Mar. 18, 2006).
44. For table data, see Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Data:
Agricultural
Biotechnology
Intellectual
Property,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic2.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2006).
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Despite the success in promoting investment in research
and development on new plant varieties and the application of
biotechnology in agriculture, the strict protection of property
rights has produced some concerns about the recent tendency
toward mergers in the industry, which has led to a
concentration of patents in fewer companies. Graph 3 shows
the ratio of the percentage of patents held by the top ten
assignees over the total number of patents. As the graph
shows, the concentration of agricultural biotech patents in the
top ten assignees has dropped since the 1970s. But if we
include the patent ownership of subsidiary organizations, this
ratio has increased over the years, indicating the effects of
mergers on the ownership of the new technologies (Graph 3). As
a result, mergers have increased the number of patents held by
the top patent holders in the last decade.
GRAPH 3. CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURE BIOTECH
PATENTS IN THE UNITED STATES45
Concentration of Agriculture Biotech Patents by Assignees
(Percentage of Top 10 Assignees over Total Number of Patents)
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SEED PROTECTION IN ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION AND
DEVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL PROTECTION
The legal framework in Argentina is far from the
comprehensive protection provided for seed producers in the

45. For graph data, see Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Data:
Agricultural
Biotechnology
Intellectual
Property,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
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United States. Argentinean legislation has evolved over time,
providing some timid increases in the protection of seed
producers. In 1935, Congress enacted the first law regulating
plant varieties.46 Although this legislation provided for the
registration of new seeds and required government approval for
new varieties to be introduced in the market, it did not provide
any legal protection to intellectual property rights for the new
seeds.47 In the following decades, succeeding governments
created diverse agencies in charge of managing the regulatory
system.48 In 1973, the Military Government passed Law No.
20247—the “Law of Seeds.”49 This was the first piece of
legislation giving commercialization rights to the inventors of
new seed varieties.50 Although this law was a step forward in
protecting intellectual property rights, it was not immediately
enacted and had to wait until 1978 for its regimentation.51 Law
No. 20247 provided for the creation of the National Seed
Commission (Comision Nacional de Semillas, CONASE), in
charge of advising and evaluating government policies
regarding the regulatory regime.52
Second, it created a

46. Law No. 12253, called “Ley de Granos,” was passed by Congress in
October 1935. See Instituto Nacional de la Semilla (INASE), Evolucion del
fitomejoramiento y la produccion de semillas en nuestro pais. Estructuras
oficiales y su marco regulatorio desde comienzos de siglo (1998) [hereinafter
Evolucion], available at http://www.dpi.bioetica.org/ovnotas1.htm.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1973,
available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY20.247.PDF.
50. Article 22 of the law states: “The property right of a variety will be
given for a period no less than 10 and no more than 20 years, according to the
type of plant and the regulations.” Id.
51. See Decree No. 1995 of 1978, available at www.mecon.gov.ar.
52. The law provides:
The Commission will be formed by ten members designed by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. . . . Five of the members will be
State representatives, two from the National Agency of Agriculture
Control and Commercialization (Direccion Nacional de Fiscalizacion y
Comercializacion), two from the National Institute of Agriculture
Technology (Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria) and one
from the National Grain Board (Junta Nacional de Granos). Five
other members will represent the private sector, one from the seeders,
two from the seed traders and production and two from the seed
users. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock will name the
president and vice-president from the members of the Commission.
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national registry and a property registry for new varieties,
providing exclusive commercialization rights to the owners for
a term between ten and twenty years, depending on the type of
seed.53 This system of varieties registration implied a two-step
procedure: the inventor of a new variety should register the
variety in the National Variety Registry54 and then apply for a
property certificate to be included in the National Registry of
Property of Varieties.55 Third, the law provided for the
recognition of foreign seeds, but it established that the country
of origin should provide similar protection for Argentine
researchers. Furthermore, the term of the property rights was
limited to the number of years left in the original certification
of property granted in the country of origin of the variety.56
Fourth, the Executive Power could declare a new variety to be
of “restricted public use,” implying that the owner of the variety
should be compensated by the state and that the ownership
should be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture.57 Finally,
the law recognized farmers’ rights to the use of seeds saved
from a previous crop and researchers’ rights to use one variety
of a seed to develop a new variety.58 As a result, the first legal
See Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1973, at art. 5,
available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY20.247.PDF.
53. See id.
54. Chapter IV of Law No. 20247 provides the regulations for the
registration of new varieties in the Registry. See id.
55. Chapter V of Law No. 20247 provides the regulations for requesting
the property of a new variety and its registration in the National Registry.
See id.
56. Article 26 states:
The property title requested for a foreign variety should be done by its
inventor or legally authorized representative established in
Argentina, and it will be granted only if the country of origin of the
variety has similar property right protection for Argentine invented
varieties. In such cases, the term of the property will be up to the
term that is left in the country of origin for the same variety.
Id. at art. 26.
57. See id. at art. 28. Article 29 limited the use of such right to two years,
although the Executive Power could extend it for another two years. See id. at
art. 29.
58. Article 25 states: “The property of a variety does not prevent that
other persons could use the variety for the creation of a new variety, which
could be claimed by its creator without the consent of the owner of the original
variety used in the process of creation.” Id. at art. 25. Article 27 provides
that: “The property right of a variety is not affected if the seed is given by
authorization of the owner, or somebody saves and sow seeds for his/her own
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registration of new varieties in the country began in 1978, after
the law was enacted by the Executive Power Decree No. 1995 of
1978.59 This Decree was proposed by the CONASE60 and
slightly modified by Decree No. 50/89.61 Nonetheless, this
legislation did not provide enough protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights for new seed varieties, since its
regulations are similar to the PVPA certificates in the United
States.
A modification to the 1978 Decree was enacted in 1991,
introducing important changes to the regulatory regime and
updating the legislation according to international standards.
The Executive Power issued Decree No. 2183/91 on October 21,
1991.62 The modification to Law No. 20247 originated not only
from the need for modernization of property rights legislation,
but also from the political pressure exerted by some
associations of seeders and other interest groups inside
CONASE, such as the Argentine Seed Association (ASA) and
the Association for the Protection of Plant Breeders (ARPOV).63
use, or use or sell as primary product or feeding the seed obtained from the
crop of the variety.” Id. at art. 27.
59. See Decree No. 1995 of 1978, available at www.mecon.gov.ar.
60. See CASEM, Camara Argentina de Semilleros Multiplicadores, 1er
Congreso Nacional de Multiplicadores de Semillas, Circular Interna No. 066
(Oct.
15,
1999),
http://www.cedasaba.com.ar/CircularesInternas/CircInt066.htm.
61. See Decree No. 50/89, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, June 11 1989.
62. See Decree No. 2183/91, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, November 1, 1991,
available
at
http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/00/inase/pdf/Normativa/DECR-2183-91.PDF.
63. At a symposium on Intellectual Property Rights in Plant
Biotechnology, Oscar Domingo presented the relevant legal framework in
Argentina:
ASA, which has been in operation for 54 years and groups
together the 67 main seed companies, and ARPOV, set up more
recently, are the bodies which deal with sectoral union activity and
work for the technological development and protection of phytogenetic
creations. ASA, which is member [sic] of CONABIA, since it was set
up 11 years ago, has played a major role in the discussion of the
regulations which Argentina now possesses for the commercial
release of a transgenic event.
Three years ago, the Association of Agricultural Technology
Chambers (ACTA) was set up and groups together the sectors
providing technological material for agricultural production, seeds
(ASA), agrochemicals and fertilizers (Chamber of Plant Health and
Fertilizers – CASAFE), veterinary products (Chamber of Veterinary
Producers – CAPROVE) and agricultural machinery (Association of
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There were several significant modifications.
First,
CONASE continued to be an advisory committee to the
Secretary of Agriculture64 and other specific agencies created
by this Decree.65 Second, a new agency, the National Seed
Service (Servicio Nacional de Semillas, SENASE) was created
to manage and enforce the regulatory regime for new
varieties.66 As a result, all the activities concerned with the
management of the system were concentrated in a specific
government agency instead of being dispersed among different
secretaries inside the Secretary of Agriculture. Accordingly,
this change would allow the government to focus on
enforcement and the definition of norms for the market of new
varieties. Third, the Decree defined the specific steps and
requirements for registration of a new variety and the granting
of property rights.67 Fourth, the Decree defined the different
types of plants that could be registered, including seeds or germ
and phytogenetic breeding varieties.68
Fifth, the special
“restricted public use” right of the Executive Power was
preserved.69 Finally, the use of saved seed was restricted only
for research purposes and farmer’s privilege.70 In addition,
Decree No. 2817 of December 30, 1991, created the National
Seed Institute (Instituto Nacional de Semillas, INASE), which
Tractor Manufacturers – AFAT), which has been acquiring major
importance in agro-industrial production activities, and is the most
important in Argentina.
As a result of the work of those institutions, Argentina acceded to
the 1978 Act of the UPOV Convention and discussions regarding
accession to the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention are very advanced.
DOMINGO, supra note 14, at 11.
64. In this text, “Secretary of Agriculture” and “Ministry of Agriculture”
are the same, since the Ministry of Agriculture was renamed to Secretary of
Agriculture in the early 1990s. Its role in the government continues to be the
same.
65. Chapter II of the Decree established the role of the CONASE. See
Decree No. 2183/91, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Nov. 1, 1991, available at
http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/DECR-218391.PDF.
66. Chapter III of Decree No. 2183/91 established the main activities for
the Servicio Nacional de Semillas. See id.
67. Chapters V to VII of Decree No. 2183/91 describe the procedures for
registration of new varieties. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Article 41 of Decree No. 2183/91 establishes the different cases in
which authorization from the owner of the variety is needed. See id.
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replaced the SENASE in the management of Law No. 20247.71
This agency is in charge of the national registry for varieties
and property of seeds, the enactment of rules regarding the
management of the system, and the enforcement of the
regulations of the law.72 By creating this new agency, the
government sought to improve enforcement and control of
property rights in new varieties:
One of the main achievements of the process, initiated in 1990 and
completed and consolidated with the creation of INASE, was to make
more transparent the commerce of self-pollinating seed species,
particularly soybean and wheat, where the legal market for these
species reached just 25% of the total demand of seeds. This meant
that most of the market for seeds had no guarantee of identity and
quality, there was a high degree of tax evasion and there was no
recognition of the property rights of the inventors of varieties
registered in property giving as a result a disincentive to invest in
new varieties.73

However, this kind of property rights protection has not
been useful in protecting the soybean seed market from
“brown-bagging” and stealing.74
In contrast to the CONASE, the INASE’s only role is the
management and enforcement of the different issues
concerning commercial rights on seeds, although the same
constituencies that formed the CONASE were represented in
this agency.75

71. See Decree No. 2817/91 Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Apr. 6, 1992,
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/50009999/8052/texact.htm.
72. See id.
73. Evolucion, supra note 46, at 15.
74. Discussing the depression of soybean seed prices by the black market
sale of seeds in Argentina, the U.S. General Accounting Office found:
A group of Argentine seed companies and breeders, called the
Argentine Association for the Protection of Plant Varieties, in
cooperation with the government, have had an effort under way since
1990 to enforce the law and limit the sale of uncertified seed on the
black market. The effort helped reduce black market sales from about
three-quarters of all soybean seed sales in 1992 to about half in 1994.
However, according to Argentine industry officials, black market sales
subsequently increased in response to higher prices for commercial
seeds following the initial marketing of Roundup Ready soybean
seeds in 1996.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 15-16.
75. See Decree No. 2817/91 Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Apr. 6, 1992,
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/50009999/8052/texact.htm.
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With respect to the farmer’s privilege, the INASE issued
Norm 35/96 INASE in February 1996 to define the limits and
scope of this privilege, broadly established in Law No. 20247.76
Under Norm 35/96 INASE tried to limit the application of the
farmer’s privilege to specific cases in which the farmer actually
saves some seed for the next crop, limiting the scope of saved
seed established by Article 27 of Law No. 20247, which allowed
other uses for saved seed.77 It established specific rules for
saved seeds to be considered under this privilege. For example,
the main criteria for being considered under this rule are that
first, the solicitor should be a farmer. Then, the farmer should
prove that the original seed was legally bought, and the saved
seed was obtained from the original, legally bought seed. Next,
the saved seed should be specifically set aside and
distinguished from other varieties. Finally, the farmer must
show the purpose of use, noting the prohibition on any transfer
or sale of the saved seeds.78 The Norm increased the difficulty
for farmers to save seed for other purposes, as it tried to control
the trade of non-legal varieties.
In 1994, Law No. 24376, enacted on September 21,
modified Law No. 20247 and its decrees,79 bringing the
legislation up to the guidelines set by the International
Agreement for the Protection of the Vegetal Obtentions (UPOV
78), approved in Paris, France in 1961 and modified in Geneva,
Switzerland in 1972 and 1978.80 Law No. 24376 approved the
UPOV 78 agreement and established that the clauses of this
agreement should prevail over the regulations of Law No.

76. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion
INASE
No.
35/96
(Feb.
28,
1996),
available
at
http://www.inase.gov.ar/tikiwiki/tikilist_file_gallery.php?galleryId=2&offset=0&sort_mode=description_desc.
77. See id. at art. 1; see Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar.
30, 1973, at art. 27, available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/00/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY-20.247.PDF.
78. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion
INASE No. 35/96, at art. 1 (Feb. 28, 1996), available at
http://www.inase.gov.ar/tikiwiki/tikilist_file_gallery.php?galleryId=2&offset=0&sort_mode=description_desc.
79. See Law No. 24376, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Oct.
25, 1994, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/04999/768/norma.htm.
80. See International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
The
UPOV
System
of
Plant
Variety
Protection,
http://www.upov.int/en/about/upov_system.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006)
(describing the UPOV system of plant protection).
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20247 and its regulatory decrees.81 The changes with respect
to the previous legislation are not too relevant, except for the
political decision to be a part of the UPOV international
That said, the adoption of the UPOV 78
agreement.82
guidelines is a limited gesture since the UPOV 78 guidelines
are not as thorough as the more recent UPOV 91 agreement,
which has not yet been adopted in Argentina.83
Due to the economic crisis in 2000, the Executive Power
ordered the Secretary of Agriculture to close the INASE,
leaving the regulatory regime for new varieties without any
management.84 The Institute was reopened in 200485 by Law
No. 25845.86 The Board of the INASE represents the different
economic stakeholders in the regulatory framework of
agricultural seeds (Figure 1).87
81. See Law No. 24376, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Oct.
25, 1994, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/04999/768/norma.htm.
82. See id.
83. See http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/ (documenting the evolution of
legislation and the adoption of the UPOV 78 treaty); see also Proteccion Legal
De
Obtenciones
Vegetales,
http://www.proyectonacion.entupc.com/proyectosart/proteccion_legas_obtecion
_vegetales.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (describing a bill presented this
year in Congress by Congressmen Eduardo Di Cola proposing the adoption of
UPOV 91).
84. See FRANCISCO PIROVANO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GAIN REPORT
AR4022: ARGENTINA PLANTING SEEDS ANNUAL 2004, at 4 (2004) (noting that
although the INASE was dissolved in 2000 due to a lack of budget, it was
reactivated on January 6, 2004 “to assure quality and proper identification of
the seed to be marketed, to promote the supply of improved varieties through
the protection of their property rights, to foster production and marketing of
planting seeds as a way to improve crop production in Argentina”).
85. See id.
86. The law states:
Article 1: the Decree 1104/200, which dissolved the Instituto Nacional
de Semillas (INASE), is derogated.
Article 2: By the present law we ratify the validity of the Decree
2817/91, restoring the Instituto Nacional de Semillas (INASE) the
functions, missions and structures regulated by the Law 20247, the
Decree 2183/91 and the Administrative Decision 489/96.
Law No. 25845, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Jan. 7, 2004,
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/9000094999/91549/norma.htm.
87. See id. The Consejo Federal Agropecuario was created by Law No.
23843 of 1990 and is a Council comprised of representatives of the rural sector
from the different regions of the country. The director of the Secretary of
Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing of the Nation presides over this council.
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FIGURE 1. STRUCTURE OF INASE88
Figure 1: Structure of INASE
1 Director: designated by the Federal
Agriculture and Livestock Council (CFA)
(Consejo Federal Agropecuario)
1 Director: designated by the National
Agriculture and Livestock Technology
(INTA) (Instituto National de Tecnologia
Agropecuaria)
1 Director: designated by seed producers
President: Named
by the Executive
Power

Board of Directors
(10 Members)

1 Director: designated by seed registrars
1 Director: designated by seed traders
1 Director: designated by fruit and trees
producers
2 Directors: designated by farmers and
consumers

The evolution of the legislation in Argentina has focused on the
development and improvement of a Plant Variety Protection
type of property rights without any advance in the field of
patenting new varieties.
GENETICALLY MODIFIED SEED AND THE QUEST FOR
PATENT PROTECTION
The Argentine government was one of the first, together
with the United States, to allow the use of genetically modified
crops. In 1991, the Secretary of Agriculture created the
Advisory National Commission for Rural Biotechnology
(CONABIA, Comision Nacional Asesora de Biotecnologia
Agropecuaria).89
This advisory group, composed of
representatives from the government and the private sector,
helped the government to develop a regulatory framework for

See Law No. 23843, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, October 19,
1990,
available
at
http://www.carbap.org/root/MostrarDocumento.asp?id=614&accion=4.
88. For figure data, see Law No. 25845, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion
Argentina,
Jan.
7,
2004,
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/9000094999/91549/norma.htm.
89. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion
No.
124/91
(Oct.
24,
1991),
available
at
http://www.senasa.gov.ar/marcolegal/Res_RY/ry_124_91.htm.
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the application and commercialization of biotechnology in
agriculture.90 As a consequence, in 1992 the CONABIA
recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock and
Fishing enact a set of rules and requirements for the approval
of experimentation with genetically modified seeds.
The
Secretary responded with Resolution 656/92 for Genetically
Modified Microorganisms.91 Accordingly, the CONABIA is in
charge of reviewing all the applications for the use of
genetically modified organisms and recommending the
approval or denial of each application to the Secretary of
Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing.92 This resolution was
90. Resolution 328/97 establishes that:
The Commission is composed of two representatives from INTA
(National Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology), two
from the National University of Buenos Aires (UBA), two from the
Argentine Forum of Biotechnology, two from the Asociacion de
Semilleros Argentinos (Argentine Seed Producers Association), two
from the private livestock sector, two from the Consejo Nacional de
Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET), two from INASE,
four from the National Service of Agricultural and food Safety and
Quality (SENASA) and some directors of specific government
agencies, two professionals on issues of livestock safety and quality,
two professionals on issues of plant safety and quality, and other
directors from specific government agencies.
Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion No. 328/97
(May
28,
1997),
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/4000044999/43548/norma.htm. The composition of the CONABIA was modified in
part by Resolution 244/04:
The Commission is composed of two representatives from INTA
(National Agriculture and Livestock Technology Institute), two from
the National University of Buenos Aires (UBA), two from the
Argentine Forum of Biotechnology, two from the Asociacion de
Semilleros Argentinos (Argentine Seed Producers Association), two
from the private livestock sector, two from the Consejo Nacional de
Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET) and some directors
of specific government agencies.
Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion No. 244/04
(Feb.
18,
2004),
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/9000094999/93050/norma.htm.
91. See OFICINA DE BIOTECNOLOGÍA, SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA,
GANADERÍA, PESCA Y ALIMENTOS, MARCO REGULATORIO DE LA
BIOTECNOLOGÍA AGROPECUARIA EN LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA 234 (2005).
92. See Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos,
Bioseguridad Agropecuaria: La Experience de la CONABIA [hereinafter
CONABIA
Experience],
http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/00/programas/conabia/bioseguridad_agropecuaria2.php (last visited Feb. 27,
2006).
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improved with further regulations for the trials in each crop by
Resolution 226/97, also recommended by the CONABIA.93 The
regulation of these permits was enacted by Resolution 289/97,
complemented by Resolution 131/98, and replaced by
Resolution 39/03.94 From 1991 to 2004, the Secretary gave 788
permits for experimentation with genetically modified
organisms.95
The procedure for obtaining a permit consists of two
stages. First, the CONABIA evaluates the application and
grants or denies a permit for experimentation. The second
stage, which allows for extensive use of experimentation,
consists of determining whether the use of the genetically
modified organism will have an impact on the environment
similar to the one produced by a similar non-genetically
modified organism.96 Only eleven applications passed the
second stage (Table 5).
TABLE 5. PERMITS GRANTED BY CONABIA97
Table 5: Permits Granted
Seed

Characteristic

Resolution – Date

Company

Soybean

Tolerance to Glifosato

SAPyA 115, 3-7-96

Nidera S.A.

Corn

Resistance to Leptidopteros

SAPyA 458, 8-2-96

Ciba-Geigy

Corn

Tolerance Glufosinato de
Ammonia
Resistance Lepidopteros

SAGPyA 77 2-11-98

AgrEvo S.A.

SAGPyA 289 3-29-98

Monsanto

Cotton

Resistance Lepidopteros

SAGPyA 290 5-29-98

Monsanto

Corn

Tolerance to Glifosato

SAGPyA 79 10-8-98

Monsanto

Cotton

Tolerance to Glifosato

SAGPyA 721 11-11-99

Monsanto

Corn

Resistance Lepidopteros

SAGPyA 442 8-16-00

Novartis

Soybean

Tolerance Glufosinato de
Ammonia
Tolerance to Glifosato

SAGPyA 47 5-7-01

Hoechst Schering
AgrEvo S.A.
Monsanto

Resistance Lepidopteros and
Tolerance Glufosinato de
Ammonia

SAGPyA 209 9-1-03

Corn

Corn
Corn

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

SAGPyA 361 5-2-03

Dow AgroSciences
S.A. and Pioneer
Argentina S.A.
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After obtaining this permit, companies need to obtain
another authorization to commercialize the genetically
modified variety. Ten of the varieties listed in Table 4 obtained
this authorization.98 To obtain this last authorization from the
Secretary and CONABIA takes at least three years.99
Given the increased interest in genetically modified
organisms and the high number of registrations of new
varieties that are genetically modified (Table 6), the
government decided to create a special agency in charge of
advising on biotechnology policy. By Resolution 219/2001, the
Secretary created the National Advisory Commission for
Agricultural Biotechnology,100 and by Resolution 362/2003
made the Biotechnology Area independent from the SubSecretary of Agricultural and Food Policy.101 Finally, by
Resolution 244/2004, the Secretary eliminated these two
agencies and created the Office of Biotechnology (Oficina de
Biotecnologia), which is in charge of advising and managing all
issues related to the biotechnology policy of the country.102
Pursuant to this change, the CONABIA depends directly on the
Office of Biotechnology.
As we can see, the regulatory
framework for biotechnological discoveries in agriculture is in
constant flux, with different agencies in charge and changes to
the structure of the management system. This differs from the
more stable and well-defined system in place in the United
States.

98. See CONABIA Experience, supra note 92.
99. See id.
100. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion
No.
219/2001
(Sept.
10,
2001),
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/6500069999/68853/norma.htm.
101. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion
No.
362/2003
(May
2,
2003),
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/8000084999/84847/norma.htm.
102. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion
No.
244/2004
(Feb.
18,
2004),
available
at
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/9000094999/93050/norma.htm.
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TABLE 6.
NEW TRANSGENIC VARIETIES REGISTERED IN
ARGENTINA103

Table 6: Registration of New Transgenic Varieties 1995-2003
Soybean
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Transgenic Non
Total Transgenic
transgenic
as % of
Total
8
8
0.0
5
11
16
31.3
12
23
35
34.3
18
18
36
50.0
28
13
41
68.3
19
7
26
73.1
32
3
35
91.4
13
2
15
86.7
9
9
100.0

Corn
Total Conventional IMI
Transgenic Transgenic
(Nonas % of
GMO)
Total
34
33
1
0
0.0
33
32
1
0
0.0
47
46
1
0
0.0
42
32
2
8
19.0
58
39
10
9
15.5
49
31
3
15
30.6
82
51
1
30
36.6
55
36
2
17
30.9
39
24
1
14
35.9

In contrast to the situation in the United States,
companies in Argentina cannot look for patent protection for
new varieties or genetically modified organisms. Despite the
many changes to the law and the demand for new technologies
in genetics, the new legal framework does not allow for strict
property rights protection via a patent system; new genetically
modified varieties must resort to the same weak protection as
other varieties.
From 1864 to 1995, the patent system in Argentina was
regulated by Law 111.104 This law did not specify any
particular regulation with respect to plants, but during this
period there were no patent applications for a new variety.
Furthermore, all the matters with regard to plant varieties
were derived from the regulations of Law No. 20247105 and,
later, Law No. 24376.106 In 1995, Congress enacted new patent
laws modifying Law No. 111 (Law Nos. 24481 and 24572).107

103. See DOMINGO, supra note 14, at 9.
104. See MIGUEL ANGEL RAPELA, DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL
EN VEGETALES SUPERIORES (2000).
105. See Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1973,
available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY20.247.PDF.
106. See Law No. 24376, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Oct.
25, 1994, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/04999/768/norma.htm.
107. See RAPELA, supra note 104.
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According to the new regulatory framework, the patenting of
new plants is expressly prohibited, although it does not specify
new plant varieties.108 Furthermore, patenting of new varieties
is not legally possible, as the law of 1994 adhered to UPOV 78,
which prohibited a regulatory system of double protection.
There is already, moreover, a government agency that grants
Plant Variety Protection certificates,109 and new laws passed in
2000, Laws Nos. 24481 and 24575, allow the patenting of
biotechnology
products
and
organisms,
including
pharmaceutical products.110 Apparently, these laws could
provide a legal vehicle for patenting plant varieties, but the
prohibitions of the Patent Law of 1995, the UPOV 78, and the
Decree 260/96, which all prohibit the patenting of plant
varieties, generate uncertainty over the ability to obtain a
patent.111 Congress has been dealing with some pressure from
seed producers to approve a new law with the UPOV 91
guidelines, which support the existence of multiple systems for
property rights protection (Figure 2). Nonetheless, even if this
legislation is passed, the courts will have to interpret the
patent law and decide if the prohibition of patenting plants can
be extended to plant varieties. As a consequence, the legal
framework is far from creating sweeping changes in the way
property rights are regulated and enforced.

108. “Since the Patent law in Argentina prohibits the patenting of plants,
in fact prohibits the patenting of varieties since, even though not all plants
can be labeled as plant varieties, all plant varieties are composed by plants
without exception.” See id. at 151. (author translation from the original: “[L]a
ley de patentes de Argentina al prohibir taxativamente el patentamiento de
plantas esta, de hecho, prohibiendo el patentamiento de variedades ya que, si
bien no todas las plantas pueden ser categorizadas como variedades vegetales,
todas las variedades vegetales estan compuestas por plantas sin excepcion
alguna.”).
109. See id.
110. See VICIEN, supra note 12, at 19.
111. See id.
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FIGURE 2. TIMELINE OF ARGENTINE LEGISLATION112
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As Figure 2 shows, the legal framework for plant varieties,
both genetically and non-genetically modified, is diffuse,
complex, and rapidly changing, producing complaints and
hesitation from seed producers. This particular system has
been widely criticized by international seed producers. For
example, Monsanto decided to stop selling soybean seeds in
Argentina because its Roundup Ready soybean variety was
being widely used by farmers who did not pay royalties or user
rights of any kind.113 As a consequence, they decided to stop
the commercialization of any soybean varieties in the country,
given the lack of protection. The government has tried to find a
solution without having to change the legal framework—a
daunting task given the economic interests at stake—by
proposing the creation of a tax.114

112. For figure data, see generally http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar (last
visited Mar. 18, 2006).
113. See Tony Smith, Argentine Soy Exports Are up, but Monsanto Is Not
Amused, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at W1.
114. See Argentina to Propose New Royalty Payment Rules for GM Seed,
Jan.
27,
2005,
SEEDQUEST,
http://www.seedquest.com/News/releases/2005/january/11144.htm.
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USING TAXES TO OVERCOME PROPERTY RIGHTS
FAILURE
In early 2004, Monsanto decided to stop the
commercialization of soybeans in Argentina due to the lack of
property rights protection. This decision caused authorities
concern, since genetically-modified seeds, such as Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready soybean, represent around 95% of the soybean
planted in the country.115 As a result of Monsanto’s protests,
the government is proposing a tax on farmers’ crops. This tax
would be distributed among seed producers as a mechanism to
compensate them for the lack of property rights enforcement.116
If we consider the effect of a tax on the price of the seed in our
model, we can show that, theoretically, the implementation of a
tax can be a substitute for the effective protection of property
rights. In the case that the government can find the optimal
tax, investment will reach the optimal level of secure property
rights. Even though the imposition of a tax would ideally
increase the level of property rights protection close to the
optimal level, there are some drawbacks to this approach.
First, nothing ensures that seed producers are going to
receive the full revenue from this tax. There is always a chance
that part of the revenues will be used by the government. This
is very different from secure property rights, where inventors
are certain to receive the full revenue of their royalties.
Second, even though the government distributes all the
revenue to producers, there could be transfers to other
producers, and it is not clear how the government is going to
determine the exact market share of each producer. Third, a
general tax does not discriminate among different users and
uses of the invention. Since it seems that there is no particular
exemption to this tax, we are in the presence of a compulsory
license, which can have important effects on the allocation of
research and development resources. Finally, it is assumed
that the cost of implementing and enforcing a tax are equal to
or less than the costs of enforcing property rights. If that is not
the case, then society may be paying a higher transaction cost
in order to protect property rights.

115. See id.
116. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The impact of the definition, scope of protection, and
enforcement of property rights on biotechnology in agricultural
markets is a topic of much debate. Scholars and policymakers
debate the pros and cons of different property regimes that
protect plant innovation. According to the literature, the
effective protection of property rights offers adequate incentives
for research and development in a biotechnology market
controlled by private firms. This kind of protection was not
needed decades ago when most of the research was done by
governmental or nonprofit institutions. However, in the last
few decades the growth of private research and the
consolidation of the private sector in multinational corporations
have brought the issue of property rights to the international
arena. This Article addressed the issue of property rights
protection in the United States and Argentina. Both countries
represent an important share of the world seed market and are
important actors in international agricultural markets.
The legal framework for property rights protection is very
different in Argentina than in the United States. Seed
producer rights are more loosely defined, and the enforcement
of those rights is limited. Patenting is not available for new
varieties, and UPOV 91 has not yet been approved. This
situation has generated complaints from seed producers,
especially foreign producers, who were unable to enforce their
rights on the seeds they introduce into the market.
Nonetheless, farmers and even the government have been
eager to adopt new technologies for seeds. This situation has
created an interesting problem since the demand for new
technologies is high, but the incentives for those technologies to
be marketed and distributed are distorted.
Some initiatives, like compulsory licensing through a tax
on the sales of grains, have generated an intense debate and
can prove to be more burdensome and costly than the creation
of a more effective regulatory system. Furthermore, the
evolution of property rights legislation has advanced at a very
slow pace, with many drawbacks and political stalemates. In
addition, enforcement has been slow and inadequate.
The comparative analysis of this Article provides a useful
framework to understand the complexities of international
regulatory systems and the challenges that multinational and
local seed producers face in developing countries with weak
regulatory systems for the protection of property rights. The
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implications of not creating and providing significant legal
regimes protecting agricultural biotechnology innovation has
significant impact in terms of the allocation of resources
devoted to both indigenous research on plant innovation and
also on the choices being made by growers acting in response to
current weak property regimes. These issues merit additional
inquiry and careful consideration as we debate the various
policy options with respect to intellectual property protection in
developing countries. Furthermore, this Article shows the
complexity and changing characteristics of property rights
regimes in developing countries. In order to promote a more
efficient international market, the issues raised by this Article
must be addressed. Otherwise, companies will face important
challenges investing in international markets, and technologies
will not be disseminated as a consequence of incongruent and
inadequate intellectual property regulations.

